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The legal regime on the protection of foreign investment through international investment 
agreements passed a very important test recently with the award rendered by an arbitration 
tribunal (the tribunal) adjudicating the dispute between Philip Morris Asia and Australia (Philip 
Morris Asia v Australia, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 17 December 2015. 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/5). The origin of the controversy was the adoption of 
tobacco plain packaging legislation by the latter in 2011, which Philip Morris regarded as a 
violation of the standards of protection provided for in the Agreement between the 
Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investment, signed on September 15, 1993 (the BIT). According to Philip Morris, the 
legislation barred the use of intellectual property on tobacco products and packaging and had, 
therefore, substantially reduced the value of Philip Morris’s investment in Australia. Fearing 
that Australia’s example would start being followed by other nations, Philip Morris did not 
hesitate in requesting far-reaching relief orders from the tribunal: suspension of the plain 
packaging legislation and compensation that could be of the order of billions of Australian 
dollars. (PMA v Australia, para. 8). The tribunal concluded that Philip Morris had carried out an 
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abuse of process, that its claims were inadmissible and, consequently, that the tribunal was 
precluded from exercising jurisdiction to settle the dispute. (PMA v Australia, para. 588). 
 
The dispute became a central focus for the criticism of international investment agreements in 
general on the basis that they constrained host States’ regulatory powers to adopt measures 
aimed at protecting the public from health and environmental risks, among others.  The threat 
of this particular litigation from a multinational corporation was not taken lightly by States. The 
criticism did not lack reasons. In fact, New Zealand had considered enacting similar legislation in 
2012 but decided to suspend the process in 2014 in light of Philip Morris’s litigation. It has 
resumed it in September. The so-called regulatory chill was then a reality, and during the 
negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) the negotiating States 
specifically addressed this threat head on in Article 29.5, with a tobacco carve-out, in the 
following terms: 
 
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) with 
respect to claims challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party. Such a claim shall 
not be submitted to arbitration under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has 
made such an election. If a Party has not elected to deny benefits with respect to such 
claims by the time of the submission of such a claim to arbitration under Section B of 
Chapter 9 (Investment), a Party may elect to deny benefits during the proceedings. For 
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greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny benefits with respect to such claims, any such 
claim shall be dismissed. 
 
PMA v Australia is then another piece in this complex puzzle. The award does not address the 
merits of Philip Morris’s claims, but it sets limits to its ability to get access to the automatic 
international dispute settlement mechanisms contemplated in international investment 
agreements.  
 
Before proceeding, it is important to mention that these agreements provide for a set of 
standards of protection for investors who are nationals of one of the parties to the treaty 
operating in the territory of any of the others. Such standards usually include national 
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and full compensation in the event of direct or indirect 
expropriation. Not less important is that, in principle, disputes between foreign investors and 
host States can be taken before an international tribunal without investors having to exhaust all 
judicial remedies before the host State’s courts. The reason for this international investment 
system was and has been that foreign investors and their capital-exporting States fear that 
domestic courts may have a bias against foreign claimants and make a determination in favour 
of their own State. Whether or not this is a credible fear regarding all States is a different 
matter. In any case and, thanks to international investment agreements, foreign investors get 




This is one of the benefits that Philip Morris has seen curtailed as a result of the award: 
whenever investor/State arbitration is not available, any dispute between Philip Morris or like-
minded investors and host States as a result of tobacco control legislation will have to be 
settled by domestic courts and under domestic law. There are two additional setbacks: an 
award for Philip Morris on jurisdiction would have allowed it to deploy similar strategies to the 
one it put in place to get access to the investor/State arbitration system of the Australia-Hong 
Kong BIT, on which more below. The second setback and closely connected is that an award on 
the merits for Philip Morris could have eventually had some persuasive character for other 
investor/States tribunals dealing with similar legislation adopted by other States that had 
decided to follow Australia’s footsteps. This was one of the purposes of Philip Morris’s global 
litigation strategy. However, domestic judgments for Philip Morris, if any, would lack this 
character, since each of them would be based on the particularities of the respective domestic 
legal framework. For the purpose of the said global litigation strategy, the award is a significant 
setback for Philip Morris and a very welcome development for host States. More recently, 
Philip Morris received a second blow in the award in Philip Morris v Uruguay, a decision the 
present author will comment on in this journal in a future issue. 
 
I. General Description of the Facts 
The Philip Morris Group (PMI), which owns dozens of subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide, has 
had a presence in Australia since 1954 through Philip Morris Australia (PM Australia), first, and 
then through PML, a wholly owned subsidiary of PM Australia.  Both were owned until 2011 by 
5 
 
Philip Morris Brands Sarl, a Swiss company that is part of the PMI Group. PMI has also had a 
presence in Asia through Philip Morris Asia, which was incorporated in Hong Kong in 1994 and 
where it has been operating since.  (PMA v Australia, paras. 96 – 97). 
 
Philip Morris and Australia started the collision course that led to the controversy when the 
World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTT) entered into 
force for Australia on February 2005. There, it is provided that States Parties have the 
obligation to implement “tobacco control measures, including measures to eliminate the 
propensity of tobacco packaging to mislead consumers about the health effects of smoking and 
comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship.” As a result, in 
October 2008, the Australian Ministry for Health and Ageing’s National Preventive Health 
Taskforce (NPHT) made public a discussion paper in which it made a suggestion to “further 
regulate the tobacco industry with measures such as ending all forms of promotion including 
point-of-sale display and mandating plain packaging of tobacco products.” The NPHT continued 
its work in this direction, and in June 2009 identified as one of the key actions to “legislate to 
eliminate all remaining forms of protection including … promotion through packaging.” (PMA v 
Australia, paras. 103 – 106). In August 2009, an Australian Senator introduced the Plain 
Tobacco Packaging Bill 2009, removing branding from cigarette packs. The process of enacting 
the legislation was affected by some lack of unity within Australian politics. In March 2010, the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs stated that the bill did not represent government 
policy, and a month later IP Australia, the organ in charge of intellectual property, voiced 
concerns about plain packaging legislation.  However, and almost at the same time, the Health 
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Minister endorsed the NPHT’s recommendation. The process of enacting the legislation was 
also affected by the complexity of Australian politics, since the Opposition leader criticized the 
plain packaging proposal in April 2010. In July 2010, the Australian government published a 
time framework for the process leading to the implementation of plain package legislation. The 
fate of the legislation was not certain, since after the August 2010 elections, the Labor Party 
and the Opposition Coalition that had criticized the legislation had the same number of seats in 
the House of Representatives. Even in May 2011, the Australian government was not sure 
about the fate of tobacco plain packaging, and its health Minister admitted that the 
government had a “very big fight on [its] hands in Parliament …” The TPP bill was introduced in 
the House of Representatives on July 6, 2011, and the bill was enacted on November 21, 2011. 
 
Philip Morris saw the prospect of the legislation as a serious risk to its investment. In addition 
to opposing it before the competent Australian authorities, it started a restructuring process in 
Asia in order to gain access to the protection afforded by a bilateral investment treaty and its 
investor/State dispute settlement mechanism. It was decided that PM Asia would be the 
vehicle and the Australia-Hong Kong BIT the applicable legal instrument. To this end, PMI 
decided to transfer PML and PM Australia to PM Asia on September 3, 2010. On January 21, 
2011, PMI Group requested the Australian Treasury’s approval or the restructuring in 
accordance with the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975. The transaction was not 
objected to by the Treasury on February 17, 2011, and on February 23, 2011, PM Asia formally 
acquired PM Australia and PML. On November 21, 2011, the day on which the tobacco plain 
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packaging legislation was adopted, PMA served Australia with the Notice of Arbitration under 
the BIT. 
 
II. The Tribunal’s Decision 
The tribunal’s main findings are related to admission of investment for the purpose of the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction, PMA’s abuse of right (or abuse of process) to seek the protection of the 
BIT, and the conditions under which a corporate restructuration can avoid to be deemed as an 
abuse of right. 
 
A fundamental aspect of any tribunal jurisdiction is whether the given investment in question is 
covered by the given international investment agreement or BIT. Australia claimed that the 
investment had not been admitted since, among other reasons, PMA had not disclosed that the 
purpose of the investment had been to obtain BIT protection. (PMA v Australia, para. 515). The 
tribunal was strict in this decision. It held that the Australian government knew of the BIT and 
of PMA’s intention to challenge the legislation, that PMA did not have to disclose the reason for 
the restructuring to seek BIT protection, and that never did the Australian government revoke 
the decision not to object the investment, nor did the government start administrative 
proceedings to declare the decision invalid. (PMA v Australia, paras. 518, 521 & 522). The 




Then, the tribunal proceeded to assess Australia’s objection that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction 
because by the time the dispute started, PMA did not have any investment in Australia. The 
tribunal expressed as a matter of general principle and following previous awards under other 
international investment agreements: 
Whenever a treaty action is based in a treaty breach, the test for a ratione temporis 
objection is whether a claimant made a protected investment before the moment when 
the alleged breach occurred. (PMA v Australia, para. 529). 
 
The tribunal then stated that, in this particular case, the dispute started when Australia had 
enacted the tobacco plain package legislation, on November 21, 2011. By this time, PMA’s 
investment had already been approved by Australia, on February 23, 2011, as was mentioned. 
The dispute then fell under the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
 
Next, the tribunal dealt with Australia’s objection to the admissibility of the claims on the basis 
of PMA’s abuse of right. According to Australia, “an abuse of right can be found where a 
corporate restructuring is motivated wholly or partly by a desire to gain access to treaty 
protection in order to bring a claim in respect of a specific dispute that, at the time of the 
restructuring, exists or is foreseeable.” (PMA v Australia, para 536). The tribunal’s findings and 




To address this objection, the tribunal began by citing previous awards under various BITs, such 
as Tidewater v Venezuela, Mobil Corporation v Ecuador, and Gremcitel v Peru, clearly indicating 
that restructuring of investment for the purpose of obtaining BIT protection in relation to 
future disputes is not illegitimate per se, nor is it an abuse of right. (PMA v Australia, paras. 541 
- 544). The tribunal then went on to assess past awards dealing with restructuring of 
investments to gain BIT protection in the event, not of a future controversy, but of a 
foreseeable dispute in which context an abuse of right would be at issue.  
 
The tribunal identified two different thresholds of foreseeability: the first was “reasonable 
foreseeability of the dispute”, articulated by the tribunal in Tidewater v Venezuela; and the 
second was “very high probability of the dispute,” adopted by the tribunal in Pac Rim v El 
Salvador. Clearly, the second criterion was much stricter than the first. Although the tribunal in 
PMA v Australia expressed that a high threshold was required to declare the existence of an 
abuse of right, the tribunal followed the less strict approach of the reasonably foreseeable 
dispute of the Tidewater tribunal. It stated: 
[T]he initiation of a treaty-based investor-State arbitration constitutes an abuse of rights 
(or an abuse of process, the rights abused being procedural in nature) when an investor 
has changed its corporate structure to gain the protection of an investment treaty at a 
point in time when a specific dispute was foreseeable. The Tribunal is of the opinion 
that a dispute is foreseeable when there is a reasonable prospect … that a measure 




The tribunal then proceeded to make its key determination on whether the dispute about 
tobacco plain packaging was reasonably foreseeable before PMI’s corporate restructuring in 
Asia.  To this end, the tribunal had to determine a date on which the controversy became 
reasonably foreseeable for PMI. The tribunal stated that “a dispute in the legal sense is a 
disagreement about rights, not merely about policy.” (PMA v Australia, para. 566), and set forth 
April 29, 2010, as such a date. Then, the Australian Prime Minister and the Health Minister 
announced the government’s unequivocal decision to introduce tobacco plain packaging 
measures. (PMA v Australia, para. 566). The tribunal noted that never after this date did the 
government express a different intention.   
 
Moreover, the tribunal made two important qualifications for its choice of date. First, the fact 
that 19 months passed between the announcement and the enactment of the legislation did 
not mean that the legislation and the dispute were not foreseeable. The length in this event 
was due to a high level of transparency in the Australian legislative process and its various 
stages of consultations with relevant stakeholders (PMA v Australia, para. 567).  For the 
tribunal, such consultation process did not affect the foreseeability of the plain packaging 
legislation.  The second qualification was that the fact that announcement of legislation was 
made by a minority government did not affect the foreseeability of the measure and of the 
dispute, either.  If it were so, in the tribunal’s words, “there would be one rule for majority 
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governments and another for minority governments, which would create difficulties for States 
whose electoral processes can result in minority governments.” (PMA v Australia, para. 568). 
 
Thus, the tribunal concluded that by the time of the PMA’s restructuring, February 23, 2011, 
the dispute with Australia over tobacco plain packaging was already reasonably foreseeable.  
(PMA v Australia, para. 569). 
 
The tribunal ended the award by dealing with PMA’s argument that there were other reasons 
for the restructuring prior to the dispute, in particular, that a wide restructuring process had 
been ongoing since 2005 and that the restructuring had as an objective the reduction of PMA’s 
tax liabilities. (PMA v Australia, paras. 575 – 576). The tribunal concluded that PMA had not 
proven that the restructuring had had a reason other than to get BIT protection. Indeed, no 
contemporary document in support of any other reason had been provided by PMA, nor had 
people familiar with the operation been presented as witnesses. (PMA v Australia, paras. 582 – 
584). 
 
On these bases, the tribunal decided that PMA’s claims were inadmissible and, therefore, that it 
was precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the dispute. (PMA v Australia, para. 588). 
 
III. Comments on Philip Morris Asia v Australia 
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The award is a product of its time in many respects.  The health risks and costs of tobacco are 
unquestionable; the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is getting ample support with 
180 State parties to date (http://www.who.int/fctc/signatories_parties/en/); States’ regulatory 
powers are in expansion in treaties and multiple awards after the Great Recession; and 
multinational corporations are facing significant resistance from civil society in many parts of 
the world, much more in this case, with the unrealistic relief PMA requested, which was the 
suspension of the legislation.  To expect that an ad hoc tribunal will totally ignore these 
significant trends is untenable. This is without saying, obviously, that the foregoing patterns 
fully predetermined the final outcome of the award. The members of the tribunal are among 
the most prestigious arbitrators in the world, and the decision is the output of a fair and well-
conducted legal proceeding. 
 
Although the case was no doubt complex for the parties, the proven fact before the tribunal 
met to write the award was that there had been no reason for the restructuring of PMA other 
than to get BIT protection. The application of the abuse of right doctrine loomed large. Had the 
restructuring had other proven objectives, the task for the tribunal would have been much 
more challenging. A combination of this fact of the dispute and the external trends already 
mentioned could have guided the tribunal’s interpretation of the facts and the applicable law.  
 
There are traces of this guidance.   First of all, and regarding the interpretation of law, the 
tribunal faced a choice between the two pre-existing thresholds of foreseeability in 
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international investment law in connection with the abuse of rights doctrine: the high degree of 
probability of the dispute vs. the reasonable degree of the controversy.  The tribunal chose the 
latter, which is a lower threshold. Selecting the former would have been difficult when applying 
it to the facts, since, for instance, in May 2011 the fate of the plain packaging legislation was 
still uncertain, due to the political climate prevailing in Australia at the time. When assessing 
this reality under the prism of the high degree of probability of Pac Rim v El Salvador, the 
tribunal would have been in an uncomfortable position to show convincingly that the dispute 
met this threshold at this particular time, when the investment had already been made by PMA. 
A conclusion of abuse of right would have been difficult to make. Instead, the facts met the 
lower bar of Tidewater v Venezuela quite well. 
 
Second, the interpretation of facts was also generous to the host State. The choice of the date 
from which the dispute became foreseeable led to a decision in conformity with global trends. 
There were many plausible dates, some of them subsequent to that of the investment, 
February 23, 2011, and hence unsuitable for a conclusion of abuse of right. Paramount among 
them was April 6, 2011, the day of introduction of the Plain Packaging Bill into the Australian 
Parliament. It was on this date that PMA knew the precise terms of the proposed legislation, 
since there is no evidence that PMA had such information before.  On this date, PMA did in fact 
know the true extent of the conflict of the measure with its rights and could have actually 
concluded that the dispute was reasonable to expect. But the tribunal instead chose as a 
determining factor the announcement of the legislation as the element to predict foreseeability. 
General announcements usually come before the full disclosure of the proposed legislation, 
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thus making a finding of foreseeability of dispute possible at an early stage for the benefit of 
host States. 
 
But in addition, the finding that announcements by a minority government can make a dispute 
foreseeable also deserves to be commented upon. The reason for this finding was the need to 
avoid having two rules: one for majority governments and another for minority governments. 
Basically, their announcements are enough for both. However, majority and minority 
governments are different political realities, and for this reason, there would be nothing wrong, 
in principle, if there were different rules. In addition, it is the political environment surrounding 
the proposed measure potentially affecting the investor, not necessarily the nature of the 
government in charge of the process, that is the factor that weighs heavily in the assessment on 
when it is reasonable for an investor to expect the adoption of the measure and the ensuing 
controversy with the host State.  
 
Finally, the tribunal was strict with PMA regarding evidence of the restructuring. What 
mattered for the tribunal was not evidence of a general restructuring process, but of the 
specific restructuring process leading to the BIT protection. The fact that there could have been 
some restructuring in PMI since 2005 was of no relevance to the tribunal. In this way, PMA’s 
ability to link its Asian restructuring to the wider process was narrowed, and getting BIT 





In synthesis, States and civil society have much to celebrate and foreign investors have some 
reasons to worry after PMA v Australia. The tribunal expanded the doctrine of abuse of rights 
and limited the latter’s ability to restructuring in order to get BIT protection.  The award also 
revealed that investor/State arbitration tribunals can effectively respond to the pressing needs 
of the day. In his annual report to the United Nations 25 years ago, the then President of the 
International Court of Justice, Robert Jennings, stated:  
[A] court must indeed apply legal rules and be seen clearly to be doing so …. 
Nevertheless, a good and useful court will not be ignorant of the political issues 
involved or of the political consequences of the decision it takes. (Sir Robert Yewdall 
Jennings, “Report of the International Court of Justice” UN Doc. A/46/PV.44. (1991)). 
 
Amen, the tribunal in PMA v Australia could have well said.  
